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This contribution deals with market abuse as one of the most important  
regulation of the capital market. Market abuse has been and still is one 
of the biggest threats of the capital market, because activities like 
insider trading makes capital market not fair investing area. It’s 
basically information asymmetry all around and moral hazard for 
insiders, considering using inside information in their own benefit. The 
main aim of the contribution is to challenge the importance of market 
abuse regulation and supervision to maintain correct function of the 
capital market. The question how not to abuse the market could be 
answered only with good set of regulation and well maintained 
supervision. 
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1 Introduction  
Market abuse has been and still is one of the biggest threats of the 
capital market, because activities like insider trading makes capital 
market not fair investing area. It’s basically information asymmetry all 
around and moral hazard for insiders, considering using inside 
information in their own benefit. The role of capital market regulation 
and supervision is to reduce such a risks and temptation for those 
insiders. The future of fair investment environment is the question of 
good regulation, precious supervision and effective law enforcement in 
cases of infringement. There are some other threats for the capital 
market, but I declare market abuse as a biggest of them, not only 
because its connected with consumer protection but mainly because of 
its universality for all areas of the capital market. The new and popular 
instruments like virtual currencies or tokens needs market abuse 
regulation and supervision clear and safe as well. The challenges for the 
future of the capital market are mostly connected with information 
asymmetry even more when the role of capital market grows in modern 
economy and that’s why this article analyses market abuse fight as one 
of the main challenges for the whole capital market. 
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2 Market Abuse 
Generally, market abuse is a forbidden and intolerable activity in the 
financial market. Such activities are banned as a way of ensuring a level 
playing field for all economic entities that enter the business. While it 
is certain that an absolute equality is imaginary, it is desirable to make 
every effort to get as close to this imaginary ideal as possible.  
Market abuse legislation applies in particular to issuers of financial 
instruments, including new investment instruments regulated under 
MiFID II, i.e. emission allowances, commodity derivatives, investment 
instruments traded on over-the-counter markets and the use of 
benchmarks - reference rates indicators (Husták, 2016). 
Market abuse is dealt with in two ways.  
• The first way deals with the treatment of inside information about 
people whom the information concerns (issuers). This way is, as a 
matter of fact, preventive in its character.  
• The second way deals with actual market abuse by someone who 
has or could have access to inside information.1   
Today, market abuse is regulated by MAR, which has modified the 
legal framework in particular by repealing the MAD (Directive 2003/6 
/EC). A directive on market abuse (Directive 2014/57/EU) was 
published and approved together with MAR—it harmonises criminal 
law in connection with market abuse (hereinafter also as the Market 
Abuse Directive). This legislation including implementing measures 
has been in effect since 3rd July 2016 (Capital Market Undertakings 
Act).  In the Czech legal regulation, we find the appropriate legal 
regulation in the Capital Market Undertakings Act, Part IX, Title IV. 
 
There are generally three conditions that constitute market abuse. We 
can talk about market abuse if someone directly or indirectly inflicts 
damage on investors. It is someone who: 
• used inside information (i.e. information that is not publicly 
available)—it is a case of insider dealing with insiders being people 
who have access to inside information   
• manipulated the mechanisms of price setting of financial 
instruments  
                                                     
1 According to Art. 7 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (here and after “MAR”): 
Inside information is information of a precise nature, which has not been made 
public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more 
financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to 
have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the 
price of related derivative financial instruments. 
 
• spread incorrect or misleading information 
 
Such behaviour can undoubtedly ruin the general level playing field 
principle for investors. It goes without saying that investors in 
possession of inside information have a much better starting position 
than the others, hence the need to use public instruments to redress the 
imbalance, even though a complete equilibrium remains purely 
theoretical.  
Market abuse can be divided into several areas:  
Insider dealing – it is a situation when an insider2 (a person in the know) 
has a piece of inside information that is not known to the public (e.g. 
before a big acquisition is made with which only the company 
management are familiar, and it is more than likely that such an 
acquisition will increase the price of the company’s shares because it 
solidifies its financial position; a member of the management then uses 
the information to their own benefit and buys, for instance, a significant 
number of shares). This person uses such an information and gains a 
certain advantage by negotiating a transaction (purchase or sale) with a 
financial instrument on his / her own account or someone else's. This 
also applies to the situation where an insider has already issued an 
instruction for a market transaction and has changed or cancelled the 
instruction as soon as he has learned the inside information. The special 
regulation of insider trading deals with the trading of persons with 
managerial authority (who are also supposed to be consecrated 
persons), which is discussed below.   
Market manipulation – again, it is a situation when an insider spreads 
untrue or misleading information about, for example, the financial 
situation of a company while (s)he is in such a position that other people 
treat the information as completely reliable (it is, for instance, a member 
of the company’s management); the insider can thus influence the share 
price of the company to their own benefit. These include the closing of 
transactions and related negotiations, the dissemination of false 
information through mass media, and the transmission of false or 
misleading information to benchmarks.3 The MAR appendix lists 
indicators that suggest manipulative behaviour associated with false or 
misleading signals, pricing, use of fictitious means and other forms of 
                                                     
2 According to art. 8 of MAR is an insider person possessing inside information 
is presumed as a member of the administrative, management or supervisory 
bodies of the issuer, or has a share of the issuer's capital, or has access to inside 
information in connection with the performance of a job or in connection with 
the performance of duties. It could also be a person involved in crime. 
3 A list of activities that are understood to be market manipulation is given in 
Article 12 MAR 
 
misleading or misleading behaviour (Commission Regulation (EU) 
2016/522). 
Illegal disclosure of inside information - This is a situation, where a 
person with inside information makes this information available to 
others if it is not a job or fulfilling the duties. This is regulated by 
Articles 10 and 14 c) MAR. It can also be a recommendation or 
guidance by an insider. 
In all examples of market abuse people seek their own benefit. They 
use information that is true but unavailable to others or it is untrue 
information but from a person who could have access to it. 
 
The fundamental point of the ban on information abuse is at least partial 
redress of the inequality of access to information; it should help an 
‘ordinary investor’ to improve their position (i.e. their access to relevant 
information). It is not really possible to forbid employees as well as 
executives from companies that issue financial instruments to trade in 
financial instruments; nonetheless, since they could have (and often 
certainly do have) inside information, their business should be 
transparent by making it public.  
Market abuse refers to an advantage gained because of better access to 
inside information. EU regulations and legal regulations in member 
countries attempt to redress this imbalance—there are rules for using, 
handling and treating inside or misleading information, which 




As far as the proper treatment of information about issuers of financial 
instruments is concerned4, they must, without delay5, disclose 
information about themselves.6  
In addition to such information, the issuer prepares and regularly 
updates the list of insiders, which it provides to the relevant authority 
(in our case, the CNB). The reason for this obligation is quite clear and 
serves in particular to trace and investigate individual violations of 
MAR, as it contributes to the identification of persons with access to 
internal information and the time from which they have access to such 
information. Using this tool, issuers can also generally control the flow 
of internal information, and thus streamline internal processes such as 
communication. 
Each person on the list confirms in writing his / her familiarity with the 
duties he / she has through access to inside information, including the 
acceptance of possible sanctions resulting from violations related to 
insider trading, or the unauthorized disclosure of inside information 
(MAR, Art. 18/2). 
The European Securities and Market Authority (here and after 
“ESMA”) publishes implementing and recommending technical 
standards also in relation to the publication of insiders' lists in order to 
ensure that acts adopted by the European Commission are applied under 
the same conditions.7 
Given that only some persons come into contact with inside 
information, the rationale for the existence of the obligation to publish 
lists of such persons is quite clear. 
If an issuer shares inside information with a third party while 
performing the usual business related to the job, this information must 
                                                     
4  A financial instrument is according to Article 124, par. 1 of the Capital 
Market Undertakings Act defined as an investment instrument admitted to 
trading on a regulated market of a Member State of the European Union or the 
admission of which to trading on a regulated market of a Member State of the 
European Union has been applied for. 
5‘Without delay’ is according to the accepted interpretation by the courts seen 
as a sufficient period of time in which the issuer of a financial instrument is 
able to announce the inside information under the given circumstances and 
while remaining operational.  ( See Constitutional Court of the Czech republic: 
IV. US 314/05  and Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech republic: 3 As 
2/2008-152). 
6 Publication is mainly on the issuer's website. Then, certainly, the requirement 
of Article 17 (1) MAR will be a rapid approach to correct and timely 
assessment of information by the public. 
7 The format of the Insider List and its update was prepared by ESMA (ESMA 
2015: Final Report). 
 
be disclosed to the public. The requirement for immediate disclosure of 
inside information significantly reduces the risk of its abuse; there 
might, however, be a delay before the information available to someone 
is announced publicly—that is why there is a legal regulation for 
insiders regarding inside information.  
The regulation says that each person in possession of inside information  
• is forbidden on insider trading or attempting to do so 
• is strictly forbidden to share the inside information with someone 
else unless it is part of the person’s practice of profession.  
• is forbidden to recommend the acquisition or disposal of financial 
instruments related to the information,  
• is also forbidden to manipulate the market or attempting to do so.  
These bans do not apply to trading own shares within buy-back 
schemes, nor do they apply to measures aimed to stabilise financial 
instruments.  
Every member country is asked to nominate one regulatory and 
supervisory authority with a common minimum set of obligations. 
These authorities apply convergent methods to fight market abuse and 
they should be able to help one another with adoption of preventive 
measures, especially in cross-border cases. Subsequent administrative 
co-operation could represent a positive contribution to the fight against 
terrorism. These authorities are also supposed to co-operate with ESMA 
(Europa.eu8  
It is important to mention here also sanctions that can be imposed for 
market abuse. The European Union attempts to enforce equal sanctions 
in all its member countries; therefore, in 2014 was adopted a market 
abuse directive. 
By accepting MAR and market abuse directive, the EU laid down a 
common definition of actus reus of crime related to market abuse, e.g. 
insider dealing, market manipulation and illicit disclosure of 
information. A new set of criminal sanctions is being created: heavy 
fines and imprisonment for at least four years are possible sanctions for 
insider dealing or market manipulation while imprisonment for two 
years is the punishment for illicit disclosure of confidential information. 
Furthermore, legal persons are fully liable for market abuse. Member 
countries are also required to conduct the judicial proceedings for these 
crimes if the crime is committed inside their borders or if the offender 
is their citizen.9 
                                                     
8 Europa.eu. Market abuse [online].  
9 První zprávy. EU stanoví trestní sankce za zneužívání trhu, a může to bolet! 
[online]. Prvnizpravy.cz [qtd. 22nd November 2017] Available at 
 
3 Director’s dealing – dealing of managing persons 
The term directors dealing with so-called managerial deals are terms 
that the current European regulation does not use, but I believe that they 
still express what the MAR is referring to as a trading of the managing 
persons, and for this reason I will use these terms for the purposes of 
this chapter. This adjustment is based on Article 19 of the MAR and 
was implemented in 2017 do the Czech legal system, as well as in the 
law of other EU countries. 
No one would surely like to trade in securities if the trading could be 
influenced from the inside. Equal treatment of capital market 
participants is, therefore, an inevitable condition for its successful 
operation. The legal regulation of directors dealing notification duty is 
a specific adjustment in the context of anti-market abuse measures, 
because in many cases, insider trading is just about the director's 
dealing. The difference is that insiders are those who have the inside 
information, whereas the directors/managers are only very likely to 
receive inside information. Director’s dealing without inside 
information is therefore not insider trading and is subject to certain 
obligations. 
Legal regulation regarding director’s dealing primarily attempts to do 
away with unfair dealing in the capital market. This unfair activity 
consists in using (or rather misusing) inside information that is not 
available to all capital market participants. Director’s dealing refers to 
an obligation that applies to people with a specific relation to the issuer 
of securities, who must notify others of dealings related to the issuer 
and their securities, including details thereof. Information that people 
with managing power,10 as amended are required to make public, 
supplement the notification and information duties that issuers have in 
general.  
Regulation regarding director’s dealing is supposed to ensure 
availability of information about transactions with securities and their 
derivatives made by people related to a securities issuer. These people 
have access to inside information about the issuer that is not freely 
available. While they do not necessarily have to use the information 
they have got to get some benefit in the securities market, they do have 
an advantage that can potentially be used in investment dealings. 
 
3.1 Roots of regulation abroad  
The director’s dealing regulation comes from the United States 
(Securities Exchange Act: Sec. 16a ). Managers or other employees of 
                                                     
<http://www.prvnizpravy.cz/zpravy/byznys/eu-stanovi-trestni-sankce-za-
zneuzivani-trhu-a-muze-to-bolet/>. 
10 In the Czech legislation, the group of persons with managerial authority is 
mentioned in § 2 par. b) Capital Market Undertakings Act 
 
the issuer that also possess at least 10% of the issuer’s shares are 
required to register their name and their position at the issuer with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. In case they make any securities 
transaction, they must report it by the end of the second working day 
following the day of the transaction. They report the transaction to the 
Commission and the relevant stock market. The report includes, among 
other things, the type of transaction, the number of traded securities, the 
price at which the transaction was realised, and the number of securities 
that remain in the possession of the person who files the report. Both 
the report and its subsequent announcement are done electronically. 
Any profit made from the purchase or the sale of securities—if they 
have been in possession of the director, the officer or the major 
stockholder for less than six month—belongs to the company, 
regardless of the reason behind the transaction. There is one exception, 
though: if the transaction is made in bona fide, i.e. in good faith 
(Goldstein, 1952).  
In the EU law was director’s dealing regulated within directive 
2003/6/EC (cf. art. 6, par. 4), which has since been replaced by MAR 
(cf. art. 19) and the market abuse directive. Persons with managerial 
powers at an issuer and persons closely associated with them are 
supposed to notify the competent authority of transactions on their own 
account relating to the securities of that issuer. Individual states must 
announce this information and make it accessible as quickly and as 
easily as possible. 
3.2 Obliged Persons 
Notification duty applies to the managing persons listed in § 2 par. 1 b) 
of Capital Market Undertakings Act: 
• A managing person, defined in § 2 par. 1 a) as a member of the 
statutory body, statutory body itself, executive director of the 
company or other person actually directing the activities of the legal 
entity. When the statutory body or member of statutory body is a 
legal person, than managing person is the person, representing the 
legal person  at statutory body. 
• supervisory body or member of the supervisory body;  
• member of the statutory body, statutory body itself, executive 
director of the company or other person actually directing the 
activities of the legal entity. When the statutory body or member of 
statutory body is a legal person, than managing person is the person, 
representing the legal person  at statutory body; 
• a person who, within the issuer, makes a decision that may affect the 
issuer's future development and business strategy and who has the 
access to inside information 
 
 
Before the CNB took over supervision of the capital market11, this area 
had been under control of the Czech Securities Commission (hereinafter 
the CSC), which was heavily involved in these activities at that time. 
The classification of persons who have the notification duty (according 
to art. 125, par. 5 of the Capital Market Undertakings Act) was dealt 
with by the CSC in its statement no. 12/2005. The statement followed 
Article 6, Section 4 of the 2003/6/EC directive12, which maintains that 
the notification duty applies to persons discharging managerial 
responsibilities within an issuer of financial instruments and persons 
closely associated with them.  
Persons discharging managerial powers are specified in MAR (Art. 3 
par. 1, pt. 25):  
• a member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of the issuer;  
• a senior executive who is not a member of the bodies referred to in 
previous point, who has regular access to inside information relating 
directly or indirectly to the issuer and power to take managerial 
decisions affecting the future developments and business prospects 
of this issuer.   
Persons discharging managerial powers have also notification duty for 
their closely associated persons. According to MAR (Art. 3 (1), pt.  26) 
are persons closely associated with persons discharging managerial 
powers:  
• the spouse of the person discharging managerial responsibilities, or 
any partner of that person considered by national law as equivalent 
to the spouse; 
• dependent child in accordance with national law;13  
• other relatives of the person discharging managerial responsibilities, 
who have shared the same household for at least one year on the date 
of the transaction concerned;  
• a legal person, trust or partnership the managerial responsibilities of 
which are discharged by a person discharging managerial 
responsibilities. It could be also the case, when these entities are set 
up for the benefit of such a person, or whose economic interests are 
                                                     
11 The Czech National Bank took over the agenda of the Securities Commission 
on the 1st April 2006.  
12 The Securities Commission followed the European legislation in view of 
Article 1 of the Capital Market Undertakings Act, which says that law regulates 
capital markets in harmony with Union norms.  
13 The term ‘dependent children’ should be interpreted according to Act on 
pension insurance, Art. 20/4. The dependent child is defined here until the end 
of compulsory education and after, not exceeding 26 years of age, if the person 
is continually preparing for their future profession, or cannot prepare for their 
future profession or cannot perform employment activities due to a disease or 
an injury, or due to an unfavourable long-term state of health.   
 
substantially equivalent to those of such persons. The provisions 
also apply to persons referred to previous points 
3.3 Which transactions must be made public and how?  
Obliged persons according to art. 19 of MAR shall notify to the issuer 
or the emission allowance market participant, and to the competent 
authority at the same time, every transaction conducted on their own 
account relating to the issuer's shares or debt instruments or derivatives 
or other financial instruments linked thereto; It is also an obligation to 
notify the suspension or lending of investment instruments. 
Previous mentioned shall apply to any subsequent transaction once a 
total amount of EUR 5 000 has been reached within a calendar year.14 
This amount includes all the trades of a person with managerial powers, 
including trades of closely associated persons. Such notifications shall 
be made promptly and no later than three business days after the date 
of the transaction. This obligation is also extended to the suspension or 
lending of financial instruments by a person with a managerial powers 
or by a closely associated person.15 
If an issuer trades on multiple markets, the competent authority is the 
place of the issuer's registration. The way in which director’s dealing is 
to be reported is again based on the MAR. 
The issuer or emission allowance market participant shall ensure that 
the information that is notified is made public in a manner which 
enables fast access to this information on a non-discriminatory basis in 
accordance with the implementing ESMA technical standards. The 
issuer or emission allowance market participant shall use such media as 
may reasonably be relied upon for the effective dissemination of 
information to the public throughout the Union (MAR Art. 19/3). 
Alternatively, national law may provide that a competent authority may 
itself make public the information. 
Issuers and emission allowance market participants shall notify the 
person discharging managerial responsibilities of their obligations in 
writing. Persons discharging managerial responsibilities shall notify the 
persons closely associated with them of their obligations under this 
Article in writing and shall keep a copy of this notification. 
This provision is a bit skewed in my opinion, but on the other hand, the 
transfer of the obligation to a particular person is certain administrative 
                                                     
14 A competent authority may decide to increase the threshold set out in 
paragraph 8 to EUR 20 000 and shall inform ESMA of its decision and the 
justification for its decision, with specific reference to market conditions, to 
adopt the higher threshold prior to its application. 
15 The Trade Notice should contain the elements set out in MAR, Art. 19/6. 
 
relief for both the competent authority and the issuer himself, who 
already keeps lists of insiders. 
Besides above mentioned MAR states, that a person discharging 
managerial responsibilities within an issuer shall not conduct any 
transactions during a closed period of 30 calendar days before the 
announcement of an interim financial report or a year-end report which 
the issuer is obliged to make public. There is an exception of such a ban 
on a case-by-case basis due to the existence of exceptional 
circumstances, such as severe financial difficulty, which require the 
immediate sale of shares; or due to the characteristics of the trading 
involved for transactions made under, or related to, an employee share 
or saving scheme, qualification or entitlement of shares, or transactions 
where the beneficial interest in the relevant security does not change. 
Clarification of these exemptions is provided by the European 
Commission Implementing Regulation.16 
The duty to notify managerial dealings enables, at least partially, to 
erase the differences between various levels of inside knowledge about 
securities issuers. Legislators thus try to create equal opportunities for 
all capital market participants. 
A possible benefit gained unfairly from inside information cannot be 
eliminated completely, though. Such a situation could occur if there 
were a ban for certain people on the purchase or sale of an issuer’s 
securities; this would, however, curtail the freedom of enterprise and 
such people would rightly feel discriminated against.  
Another measure adopted in this area is the fact that insider trading has 
been made punishable by criminal law. This is closely related to 
managerial dealings. Yet, if obliged persons properly and in due time 
notify the competent authority of any securities transactions of the 
issuer, they reduce suspicion of insider trading. The existence of and 
strict adherence to legal regulations concerning managerial dealings is 
in everybody’s interests, whether it be capital market participants or the 
obliged persons that are to notify certain securities transactions. 
Currently, market abuse is regulated by MAR and the market abuse 
directive. Without any doubt we might say that we can hardly expect 
anything completely new and ground-breaking by the MAR 
implementation in the notification duty—rather, the existing regulation 
is going to be extended, specified and updated. What is new and very 
important, though, is the market abuse directive. It is concerned with 
the elements constituting market abuse and its criminalisation—the aim 
is the identical interpretation of what market abuse is, including 
potential punishment for such activities.  
                                                     
16 Exceptions to this obligation are specified in the European Commission's 
Implementing Regulation 2016/522.  
 
4 Conclusion 
I am convinced that new market abuse legislation in Europe definitely 
fulfils the requirements for the maintenance of fair access to the 
financial market and its activities there. Among other things, it 
represents a formal execution of a previously established and promoted 
strategy to ban strictly any form of market abuse with equal punishment 
throughout the EU. Such a step appears to be eminently desirable due 
to frequent cross-border activities of big financial institutions whose 
impact is truly international. Only by fixing the interpretation of what 
constitutes market abuse and by agreeing on what punishment can be 
meted out to the offender in member countries of the EU, can rules 
regarding the ban on market abuse be internationally standardised, 
thereby making the international financial market better equipped to 
provide equal opportunities for investors and consumers. There is no 
such an important regulation of the capital market like market abuse, 
because it constitutes equal position for all participants in the area, 
where so much capital is at stake. Abusing the market is just too 
tempting in order to earn big money in short term and there is no other 
threat of the capital market, besides general protection of the capital 
market existence. The only prevention against market abuse is strong 
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